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The relation between Ising spin systems and public-
key cryptography is investigated using methods of statistical
physics. The insight gained from the analysis is used for de-
vising a matrix-based cryptosystem whereby the ciphertext
comprises products of the original message bits; these are se-
lected by employing two predetermined randomly-constructed
sparse matrices. The ciphertext is decrypted using methods
of belief-propagation. The analyzed properties of the sug-
gested cryptosystem show robustness against various attacks
and competitive performance to modern cyptographical meth-
ods.
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Public-key cryptography plays an important role in
many aspects of modern information transmission, for in-
stance, in the areas of electronic commerce and internet-
based communication. It enables the service provider to
distribute a public key which may be used to encrypt
messages in a manner that can only be decrypted by the
service provider. The on-going search for safer and more
efficient cryptosystems produced many useful methods
over the years such as RSA (by Rivest, Shamir and Adle-
man), elliptic curves, and the McEliece cryptosystem to
name but a few.
In this Letter, we employ methods of statistical physics
to study a specific cryptosystem, somewhat similar to the
one presented by McEliece [1]. These methods enable
one to study the typical performance of the suggested
cryptosystem, to assess its robustness against attacks and
to select optimal parameters.
The main motivation for the suggested cryptosys-
tem comes from previous studies of Gallager-type error-
correcting codes [2–4] and their physical properties [5,6].
The analysis exposes a significantly different behaviour
for the two-matrix based codes (such as the MN code
[3]) and single-matrix codes [4], which may be exploited
for constructing an efficient cryptosystem.
In the suggested cryptosystem, a plaintext represented
by an N dimensional Boolean vector ξ ∈ (0, 1)N is en-
crypted to the M dimensional Boolean ciphertext J us-
ing a predetermined Boolean matrix G, of dimensionality
M×N , and a corruptingM dimensional vector ζ, whose
elements are 1 with probability p and 0 otherwise, in the
following manner
J = G ξ + ζ , (1)
where all operations are (mod 2). The matrix G and the
probability p constitute the public key; the corrupting
vector ζ is chosen at the transmitting end. The matrix
G, which is at the heart of the encryption/decryption
process is constructed by choosing two randomly-selected
sparse matrices A and B of dimensionality M×N and
M×M respectively, defining
G=B−1A (mod 2) .
The matrices A and B are generally characterised by K
and L non-zero unit elements per row and C and L per
column respectively; all other elements are set to zero.
The finite, usually small, numbers K, C and L define a
particular cryptosystem; both matrices are known only
to the authorised receiver. Suitable choices of probability
p will depend on the maximal achievable rate for the
particular cryptosystem as discussed below.
The authorised user may decrypt the received cipher-
text J by taking the (mod 2) product BJ = Aξ+Bζ.
Solving the equation
AS +Bτ = Aξ +Bζ (mod 2), (2)
is generally computationally hard. However, decryption
can be carried out for particular choices of K and L
via the iterative methods of Belief Propagation (BP) [3],
where pseudo-posterior probabilities for the decrypted
message bits, P (Si = 1|J) 1 ≤ i ≤ N (and similarly for
τ ), are calculated by solving iteratively a set of coupled
equations for the conditional probabilities of the cipher-
text bits given the plaintext and vice versa. For details
of the method used and the explicit equations see [3].
The unauthorised receiver, on the other hand, faces
the task of decrypting the ciphertext J knowing only G
and p. The straightforward attempt to try all possible ζ
constructions is clearly doomed, provided that p is not
vanishingly small, giving rise to only a few corrupted bits;
decomposing G to the matrices A and B is known to be
a computationally hard problem [7], even if the values of
K,C and L are known. Another approach to study the
problem is to exploit the similarity between the task at
hand and the error-correctingmodel suggested by Sourlas
[4], which we will discuss below.
The treatment so far was completely general. We will
now make use of insight gained from our analysis of
Gallager-type [5] and Sourlas [6] error-correcting codes
to suggest a specific cyptosystem construction and to as-
sess its performance and capabilities. The method used
in both analyses [5,6] is based on mapping the problem
onto an Ising spin system Hamiltonian, in the manner
discovered by Sourlas [4], which enables one to analyse
typical properties of such systems.
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To facilitate the mapping we employ binary represen-
tations (±1) of the dynamical variables S and τ , the
vectors J , ζ and ξ, and the matrices A, B and G, rather
than the Boolean (0, 1) ones.
The binary ciphertext J is generated by taking
products of the relevant binary plaintext message bits
J〈i1,i2...〉 = ξi1ξi2 . . . ζ〈i1,i2...〉, where the indices i1, i2 . . .
correspond to the non-zero elements of B−1A, and
ζ〈i1,i2...〉 is the corresponding element of the corrupting
vector (the indices 〈i1, i2 . . .〉 corresponds to the specific
choice made for each ciphertext bit). As we use statis-
tical mechanics techniques, we consider both plaintext
(N) and ciphertext (M) dimensionalities to be infinite,
keeping the ratio between them N/M finite. Using the
thermodynamic limit is quite natural here as most trans-
mitted ciphertexts are long and finite size corrections are
likely to be small.
An authorised user may use the matrix B to obtain
Eq.(2). To explore the system’s capabilities one examines
the Gibbs distribution, based on the Hamiltonian
H =
∑
<i1,..,iK ;j1,..,jL>
D<i1,..,iK ;j1,..,jL> δ
[
−1 ; J<i1,..,iK ;j1,..,jL>
· Si1 . . . SiK τj1 . . . τjL
]
−
Fs
β
N∑
i=1
Si −
Fτ
β
M∑
j=1
τj . (3)
The tensor product D<i1,..,iK ;j1,..,jL>J<i1,..,iK ;j1,..,jL>,
where J<i1,..,jL> = ξi1ξi2 ..ξiK ζj1ζj2 ..ζjL , is the binary
equivalent of Aξ+Bζ, treating both signal (S and in-
dex i) and the corrupting noise vector (τ and index j)
simultaneously. Elements of the sparse connectivity ten-
sor D<i1,..,jL> take the value 1 if the corresponding in-
dices of both signal and noise are chosen (i.e., if all cor-
responding elements of the matrices A and B are 1) and
0 otherwise; it has C unit elements per i-index and L per
j-index, representing the system’s degree of connectivity.
The δ function provides 1 if the selected sites’ product
Si1 ..SiK τj1 ..τjL is in disagreement with the corresponding
element J<i1..jL>, recording an error, and 0 otherwise.
Notice that this term is not frustrated, and can therefore
vanish at sufficiently low temperatures (T =1/β→0), im-
posing the restriction of Eq.(2), while the last two terms,
scaled with β, survive. The additive fields Fs and Fτ are
introduced to represent our prior knowledge on the signal
and noise distributions, respectively.
The random selection of elements in D introduces dis-
order to the system which is treated via methods of statis-
tical physics. More specifically, we calculate the partition
function Z(D,J) = Tr{S,τ } exp[−βH], which is then av-
eraged over the disorder and the statistical properties of
the plaintext and noise, using the replica method [5,8],
to obtain the related free energy F = −〈lnZ〉ξ,ζ,D. The
overlap between the plaintext and the dynamical vector
m= 1
N
∑N
i=1 ξiSi will serve as a measure for the decryp-
tion success.
Studying this free energy for the case ofK=L=2 and in
the context of error-correcting codes [5], indicates the ex-
istence of paramagnetic and ferromagnetic solutions de-
picted in the inset of Fig.1. For corruption probabilities
p>ps one obtains either a dominant paramagnetic solu-
tion or a mixture of ferromagnetic (m=±1) and param-
agnetic (m=0) solutions as shown in the inset; thin and
thick lines correspond to higher and lower free energies
respectively, dashed lines represent unstable solutions.
Lines between the m = ±1 and m = 0 axes correspond
to sub-optimal ferromagnetic solutions. Reliable decryp-
tion may only be obtained for p<ps, which corresponds
to a spinodal point, where a unique ferromagnetic solu-
tion emerges at m=1 (plus a mirror solution at m=−1).
The most striking result is the division of the complete
space of S and τ values to two basins of attraction for the
ferromagnetic solutions, for p < ps, implying convergence
from any initialisation of the BP equations. Critical cor-
ruption rate values for M/N = 2 were obtained from the
analysis and via BP solutions as shown in Fig.1, in com-
parison to the rate obtainable from Shannon’s channel
capacity [9] (solid line). The priors assumed for both the
plaintext (unbiased in this case, Fs = 0) and the cor-
rupting vector (Fτ = (1/2) ln[(1 − p)/p]) correspond to
Nishimori’s condition [11], which is equivalent to having
the correct prior within the Bayesian framework [12]
The initial conditions for the BP-based decryption
were chosen almost at random, with a very slight bias
of O(10−12) in the initial magnetisation, corresponding
to typical statistical fluctuation for a system size of 1024.
Cryptosystems with otherK and L values, e.g.,K,L ≥ 3,
seem to offer optimal performance in terms of the cor-
ruption rate they accommodate theoretically, but suffer
from a decreasingly small basin of attraction as K and
L increase. The co-existence of stable ferromagnetic and
paramagnetic solutions implies that the system will con-
verge to the undesired paramagnetic solution [5] from
most initial conditions which are typically of close-to-zero
magnetisation. It may still be possible to use successfully
specific matrices with higher K and L values (such as in
[13]); however, these cannot be justified theoretically and
there is no clear adventage in using them.
To conclude, for the authorised user, the K=L=2 cryp-
tosystem offers a guaranteed convergence to the plaintext
solution, in the thermodynamic limit N →∞, as long as
the corruption process has a probability below ps. The
main consequence of finite plaintexts would be a decrease
in the allowed corruption rate with little impact on the
decoding success.
The task facing the unauthorised user, i.e., finding the
plaintext from Eq. (1) was investigated via similar meth-
ods by considering the Hamiltonian
H=−
∑
〈i1,..iK′〉
G〈i1,..iK′〉 J〈i1,..iK′〉 Si1..SiK′ −
Fs
β
N∑
k=1
Sk ,
2
using Nishimori’s temperature β = (1/2) ln[(1 − p)/p].
The number of plaintext bits in each product is denoted
K ′, S is the N dimensional binary vector of dynamical
variables and G is a dense tensor with C′ unit elements
per index (setting the rest of the elements to zero) and is
the binary equivalent of the Boolean matrix G [6]. The
latter, together with the statistical properties of the cor-
rupting vector ζ constitutes the public key used to de-
termine the ciphertext J . The last term on the right is
required in the case of sparse or biased messages and will
require assigning a certain value to the additive field Fs.
The matrix G generated in the case of K =L=2 is
dense and has a certain distribution of unit elements per
row. The fraction of rows with a low (finite, not ofO(N))
number of unit elements vanishes asN increases, allowing
one to approximate this scenario by the diluted Random
Energy Model [10] studied in [6] where K ′, C′ →∞ while
keeping the ratio C′/K ′ finite.
To investigate the typical properties of this (frustrated)
model, we calculate again the partition function and the
free energy by averaging over the randomness in choos-
ing the plaintext, the corrupting vector and the choice
of the random matrix G (being generated by a product
of two sparse random matrices). To assess the likeli-
hood of obtaining spin-glass/ferromagnetic solutions, we
calculated the free energy landscape (per plaintext bit -
f) as a function of overlap m. This can be carried out
straightforwardly using the analysis of [5], and provides
the energy landscape shown in Fig.2. This has the struc-
ture of a golf-course with a relatively flat area around the
one-step replica symmetry breaking (frozen) spin-glass
solution and a very deep but extremely narrow area, of
O(1/N), around the ferromagnetic solution. To validate
the use of the random energy model we also added nu-
merical data (+, with error-bars), obtained by BP, which
are consistent with the theoretical results.
This free-energy landscape may be related directly to
the marginal posterior P (Si = 1|J) 1 ≤ i ≤ N and is
therefore indicative of the difficulties in obtaining ferro-
magnetic solutions when the starting point for the search
is not infinitesimally close to the original plaintext (which
is clearly highly unlikely). It is plausible that any local
search method, starting at some distance from the ferro-
magnetic solution, will fail to produce the original plain-
text. Similarly, any probabilistic method, such as simu-
lated annealing, will require an exponentially long time
for converging to the m=1 solution. Numerical studies
of similar energy landscapes show that the time required
increases exponentially with the system size [14].
Most attacks on this cryptosystems, by an unautho-
rised user, will face the same difficulty: without explicit
knowledge of the current plaintext and/or the decomposi-
tion of G to the matrices A and B it will require an expo-
nentially long time to decipher a specific ciphertext. Par-
tial or complete knowledge of the ciphertext/plaintext as
well as partial knowledge of the matrix B (while O(N)
of the elements remain unknown) will not be helpful for
decomposing G which will still require an exponentially
long time to carry out.
We will consider here two attacks on specific plain-
texts with partial knowledge of the corrupting vector ζ
or of the matrix B. In the first case, knowing paM of
the pM corrupting bits may allow one to subtract the
approximated vector ζ̂ from the ciphertext and take the
product of G−1 and the resulting ciphertext. This attack
is similar to the task facing an unauthorised user with a
reduced corruption rate of (p−pa). For any non-vanishing
difference between pa and p, deciphering the transmitted
message remains a difficult task.
A second attack is that whereby the matrix B is known
to some degree; for instance, the location of a fraction of
the unit elements, say 1−ρ is known. From Eq.(2) one
can identify the absent information as having a higher ef-
fective corruption level of p+g(ρ), where g(·) is some non-
trivial function that depends on the actual scenario. To
secure the transmission one may work sufficiently close
to the critical corruption level ps such that the additional
effective noise ρ will bring the system beyond the criti-
cal corruption rate and into the paramagnetic/spin-glass
regime. However, the drawbacks of working very close to
ps are twofold: Firstly, average decryption times using
BP methods (τ) will diverge proportionally to 1/(ps−p)
as demonstrated in the inset of Fig.2. Secondly, finite-
size effects are expected to be larger close to ps, which
practically means that the system may not converge to
the attractive optimal solutions in some cases.
We will end this presentation with a short discussion on
the advantages and drawbacks of the suggested method
in comparison with existing techniques. Firstly, we would
like to point out the differences between this method
and the McEliece cryptosystem. The latter is based on
Goppa codes and is limited to relative low corruption
levels. These may allow for decrypting the ciphertext
using (many) estimates of the corruption vector. Our
suggestion allows for a significant corruption level, thus
increasing the security of the cryptosystem. In addition,
the suggested construction, K=L=2, is not discussed
in the information theory literature (e.g. in [3]) which
typically prefers higher K,L value systems. Secondly,
in comparison to RSA where decryption takes O(N3)
operations, our method only requires O(N) operations,
multiplied by the number of BP iterations (which is typ-
ically smaller than 100 for most system sizes examined
except very close ps). Encryption costs are of O(N
2) (as
in RSA) while the inversion of the matrix B is carried
out only once and requires O(N3) operations.
The two obvious drawbacks of our method are: 1) The
transmission of the public key, which is a dense matrix
of dimensionality M×N . However, as public key trans-
mission is carried out only once for each user we do not
expect it to be of great significance. 2) The ciphertext
to plaintext bit ratio is greater than one to allow for cor-
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ruption, in contrast to RSA where it equals 1. Choosing
the N/M ratio is in the hands of the user and is directly
related to the security level required; we therefore do not
expect it to be problematic as the increased transmission
time is compensated by a very fast decryption.
We examine the typical performance of a new cryp-
tosystem, based on insight gained from our previous stud-
ies, by mapping it onto an Ising spin system; this com-
plements the information theory approach which focuses
on rigorous worst-case bounds. We show that autho-
rised decryption is fast and simple while unauthorised
decryption requires a prohibitively long time. Important
aspects that are yet to be investigated include finite size
effects and methods for alleviating the drawbacks of the
new method.
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FIG. 1. Critical transmission rate as a function of the cor-
ruption rate p for an unbiased ciphertext. Numerical solutions
(of the analytically obtained equations - ✸) and BP iterative
solutions (of system size N =104, +), were averaged over 10
different initial conditions of almost zero magnetisation with
error bars much smaller than the symbol size. Inset: The fer-
romagnetic (F) (optimal/sub-optimal) and paramagnetic (P)
solutions as functions of p; thick and thin lines denote stable
solutions of lower and higher free energies respectively, dashed
lines correspond to unstable solutions.
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FIG. 2. The free energy landscape as a function of m for
the transmission rate N/M = 1/2 and flip rate p = 0.08;
theoretical values are represented by the solid line, numerical
data, obtained by BP (N = 200) and averaged over 10 differ-
ent initial conditions, are represented by symbols (+). The
landscape is deep and narrow (of width O(1/N)) atm = 1 and
rather flat elsewhere. Inset - scattered plot of mean decryp-
tion times - τ . The optimal fitting of straight lines through
the data provides another indication for the divergence of de-
cryption time for corruption rate close to ps = 0.953 ± 5 (in
this example).
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